Development of International River Basins: Regulation of Riparian Competition by Shapiro-Libai, Nitza
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 45 | Issue 1 Article 2
Fall 1969
Development of International River Basins:
Regulation of Riparian Competition
Nitza Shapiro-Libai
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the International Law Commons, and the Water Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Shapiro-Libai, Nitza (1969) "Development of International River Basins: Regulation of Riparian Competition," Indiana Law Journal:
Vol. 45 : Iss. 1 , Article 2.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol45/iss1/2
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RIVER BASINS:
REGULATION OF RIPARIAN COMPETITION tt
NITZA SHAPIRO-LIBAIt
Approximately 150 river basins straddle international boundaries,
and together they cover almost one-half of the world's land surface,
excluding Australia and Antarctica.' "International river basin . . .
development will undoubtedly be one of the major means of accomplishing
economic growth and social change in the next few decades, especially
in the developing countries"2 where most of these rivers flow.
International rivers traditionally have been considered in light of
the theory of territorial sovereignty. The segment of the international
river flowing within the borders of a state was regarded as part of the
state's territory as much as its national rivers, mountains or valleys. With
the exception of navigation and to a certain extent fishing and flotage
the distinguishing characteristics of the international river were not treat-
ed outside the territorial context. Specific treatment of the effects ensuing
from the distinguishing features of international rivers is of recent origin.
Modern technology makes possible improved distribution of water
resources and expansion of their exploitation. More water resources may
be harnessed for the generation of hydroelectric energy and the supply of
irrigation to extended areas, thus benefiting the agricultural and industrial
sectors of the economies. Further contribution to the general well-being
is made through the control of floods and the provision of water
and electricity for domestic consumption. Making optimum use of
water resources generally involves coordination of all the water develop-
ment projects undertaken within the various parts of a river basin.
Despite the benefits derived from river development and the growing
concern about water resources, only a few of the world's international
rivers have been developed. This phenomenon is attributed to both an
unawareness of the rivers' opportunities and a lack of technical expertise
and financial resources in developing countries.
Competition between riparians over the exploitation of river resources
also may inhibit development. Riparians who wish to secure for them-
-t First of two parts. The second installment will appear in the next issue.
t Doctor of Comparative Law. Mrs. Shapiro-Libai is currently a resident of Tel-
Aviv, Israel.
1. Sewell & White, The Lower Mekong, 558 INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION 5
(1966).
2. Id.
3. F. BERBER, RIVERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5, 6 (1959).
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selves the maximum possible opportunities may fear that joining in the
development of the river will aid the economic growth of other riparians
at their expense. Such economic competiton may be further aggravated by
political rivalry. The disappearance of colonial systems increased the
number of independent riparian states, thereby adding to the economic
and political rivalry surrounding international river development.
The function of international law in this area should be to transfer to
the legal plane the level of achievement attained on the technical plane.
The inherent difficulty in doing so is the gap between the rapid advance-
ment in technology and the ability of customary international law to paral-
lel this advancement with the formulation of binding legal principles.
The gap can be bridged by treaty-made international law. If international
law is expected to serve as an instrument for promoting general welfare in
the world, and customary international law cannot keep pace with techno-
logical advancement, effort should be directed towards bridging the gap
by initiating international legislative action.
The term "international river" usually designates a river which flows
through or between the territories of two or more states.4 Occasionally,
different terms are used, such as "multinational rivers,' ' or "not national
and boundary rivers."6 The differences in terminology do not reflect
different factual situations but differences of opinion as to the legal princi-
ples applicable to these rivers.
An innovation in terminology was introduced by the New York
Conference of the International Law Association in September 1958.
The conference chose the term "drainage basin" to define
an area within the territories of two or more states in which
all the streams of flowing surface water, both natural and
artificial, drain a common watershed terminating in a common
outlet or common outlets either to the sea or to a lake or to
some inland place from which there is no apparent outlet to a sea.'
This terminology was adopted in response to doubts raised in the
Association's 1956 Dubrovnik conference and represents a broader ap-
proach to the complexity of the factors affecting rivers. The doubts
raised by the First Committee Report at the Dubrovnik Conference
"whether tributary streams should be included in, or whether artificial
waterways should be excluded from, the definition of an international
4. For the history of the international rivers concept, see generally, G. GLOS,
INTERNATIONAL RIVERS: A POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE 1-10 (1961).
5. G. Schwarzenberger, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 105 (1960).
6. I. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 464 (1955).
7. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FORTY-EIGHTH CONFERENCE
HELD AT NEW YORK viii (1959).
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river"8 were resolved by the New York conference through the inclusion
of both.'
The Helsinki conference of the International Law Association in
August 1966 expanded the definition previously adopted to include
underground waters. The term chosen by the Helsinki conference was
"international drainage basin," and its scope of application was defined as
"a geographical area extending over two or more States determined by
the watershed limits of the system of waters, including surface and
underground waters, flowing into a common terminus."'" This definition
of an international drainage basin was not claimed to represent a tradi-
tional concept of international law. In fact, the New York conference
explicitly stated that although there were some precedents concerning
underground waters, international law for the most part had been con-
cerned only with surface waters. 1 The new definition was based on the
argument that a drainage basin was an indivisible unit, requiring com-
prehensive consideration for the attainment of two goals: the effectuation
of maximum utilization and development of any portion of the drainage
basin's waters, and the accommodation of potential or existing conflicts
in instances of multi-use development. 2
This study will adopt the proposition that waters which find their
way to a basin's outlet form an interdependent system. 3 Accordingly,
the term "international river basin" is used to define an area extending
over two or more states determined by the watershed limits of the system
of waters, including surface and underground waters, flowing into a
common terminus.
The state of fluidity marking the definition of the concept of inter-
national rivers also applies to the principles governing the exploitation
of these rivers. The various theories of riparian rights in internatonal
rivers can be classified into three categories: territorial supremacy, ter-
ritorial integrity, and the unity of a river basin.
The principle of territorial supremacy empowers a state to exercise
supreme authority over all components of its territory 4 by virtue of which
8. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF LAW GOVERNING THE USE
OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS: RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AssOcIA-
TION AT ITS CONFERENCE HELD IN AUGUST 1956 AT DUBROVNIK, YUGOSLAVIA, TOGETHER
WITH REPORTS AND COMMENTARIES SUBMITTED TO THE ASSOCIATION 3 (1956).
9. In fact, the New York Conference rejected the following definition adopted by
the Dubrovnik Conference: "An international river is one which flows through or
between the territories of two or more states." Id. at 2.
10. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIFTY-SECOND CONFERENCE
HELD AT HELSINKI 484, 485 (1967).
11. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, supra note 7, at IX.
12. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSoCIATION, supra note 10, at 485.
13. See L. TECLAFF, THE RIVER BASIN IN HISTORY AND LAW 11 (1967).
14. I. OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, at 286.
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it can dispose freely of all the water actually flowing through its territory
without concern for the damaging effects on a lower riparian. The
principle of territorial integrity gives a state the right to demand that
other states abstain from committing any act which constitutes a violation
of its territorial integrity. 5 Under this principle, a lower riparian has the
right to demand the continuation of the natural flow of water coming from
the upper riparian without concern for the needs of the upper riparian. The
concept of the unity of a river basin is based on the principle that every
river basin is naturally an indivisible physical unit"8 which should be
treated as an integrated whole ;"7 it establishes an interdependence between
the co-riparians founded on the interdependence between the segments of
a river basin. Accordingly, this concept stresses the idea of mutuality of
rights and duties to the exclusion of any exclusive and superior right of
any upper or lower riparian. The inconsistency among the three principles
precludes the possibility of their forming a system of international river
law.
The absence of agreed principles of international law inhibits the
regulation of riparian competition over the exploitation of international
river basin resources and impedes the development of these basins. In view
of the growing importance of international river development as a means
of accomplishing economic growth, the need for finding ways to over-
come that impediment is apparent. Discussion of the principles currently
claimed to represent customary international law will be oriented toward
examining the adequacy of these principles to regulate international river
development. 8
TERRITORIAL SUPREMACY
The principle of territorial supremacy is summarized by Schwarzen-
berger in A Manual of International Law:
If a river is a multinational river, that is to say, passes through
more than one state, each of its national segments is under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the state through the territory of which
it happens to flow. In the absence of treaty arrangements to the
15. Id.
16. H. SMITH, THE ECONOMIC USE OF INTERNATIONAL RiWRs 150 (1931).
17. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, supra, note 7.
18. For discussion of the extent to which certain principles are accepted as
customary international law, see F. BERBER, supra note 3, at 52-253; see also COMMITTEE
ON THE USES OF WATERS OF INTERNATIONAL R=vRs, AMERICAN BRANCH OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE
USE OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS: STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND RECOMENDA-
TIONS WITH A COMMENTARY AND SUPPORTING AUTHORITIES SUBMITTED TO THE INTER-
NATIONAL LAw ASSOCIATION (1958).
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contrary, rivers are as much as any other land territory subject
to territorial jurisdiction."0
Schwarzenberger contends that the segment of an international river
which passes through a state is under the exclusive jurisdiction of that
state and that limitations on state jurisdiction imposed by customary law
or general principles of law recognized by civilized nations are inappro-
priate. The arguments relying on analogies drawn from the rights of
riparian owners in the municipal law of private property or limitations of
such rights under municipal public law are discarded on the ground of
being "question-begging analogies.""0 The analogies imported from the
quasi-international law on the federal level are considered illegitimate,
since application of these analogies would infer "that unorganized or
partly organized international society has reached a degree of integration
that may be expected only on a federal level."2 1 The proposition that a
doctrine which prohibits the abuse of national rights is established on the
level of international customary law is dismissed as no more than "mere
wishful thinking.""2
The territorial supremacy principle operates strongly in favor of
upper riparian states and has been invoked most often by them. The
effect of the upper riparians' reluctance to acknowledge limitations on
their sovereignty imposed by international law is indicated in Fenwick's
statement of rules governing international rivers:
It is doubtful whether international law can be said to have
recognized any servitude corresponding to that existing in civil
and in common law in the form of a right to uninterrupted flow
of streams and rivers. Conscious of the possession of the tradi-
tional rights of sovereignty, states in possession of the upper
waters of a river have not recognized any general obligation to
refrain from diverting its waters and thereby denying to the
states in possession of the lower waters the benefits of its full
19. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 5. See also H. BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS
274 (1952):
In the absence of such a regime of internationalization accepted by a riparian
State, national rivers and those portions of international rivers which are
within the national territory are subject to the exclusive control of the territorial
sovereign. No general principle of international law prevents a riparian State
from excluding foreign ships from the navigation of such river or from
diverting or polluting its waters.
For discussion of the territorial supremacy doctrine, see generally Bains, The Diversion
of International Rivers, 1 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 38-52 (1961) and Raju, Principles of Law
Go'verning the Diversion of International Rivers, 2 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 370-74 (1962).
20. G. SCHWVARZENBERGER, supra note 5.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 106.
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flow. Such restrictions as have been recognized, have been in
every case the result of treaty stipulations.23
The upper riparians' position is based on the grounds that endow-
ment with water resources should be treated no differently than endow-
ment with other natural resources.24 However, the analogy between water
resources and other natural resources, such as coal or diamond mines, is
vulnerable on two grounds. Unlike other resources, water resources, if
uninterrupted by artificial activity, move from one riparian to another.
The location of the international river endows the upper riparian with a
geographic advantage over the other riparians in respect to the exploita-
tion of the waters; but the geographic advantage in exploitation is not
identical with natural possession of water resources. The significance of
the fluid nature of water resources can be compared with the conclusions
of the United States Supreme Court with regard to the mobility of
migratory birds:
To put the claim of the state upon title is to lean upon a slender
reed. Wild birds are not in the possession of anyone; and pos-
session is the beginning of ownership. The whole foundation
of the state's right is the presence within its jurisdiction of
birds that yesterday had not arrived; tomorrow, may be in
another state; and in week a thousand miles away. . . . The
subject matter is only transitorily within the state and has no
permanent habitat therein.25
Further, the analogy is vulnerable because of the injurious effects
which may result from exploiting a geographic advantage. Unlike the
23. C. FEqwlcK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 381 (1948).
24. This rationalization was used against a draft provision of the Geneva Con-
ference of 1923 which called for prior agreement of all riparians where hydraulic power
works were likely to change the natural flow of water. The Belgian representative
pointed out that the proposed provision would interfere with state sovereignty. He
argued that the states were under no obligation to part with their natural resources in
favor of neighboring states which did not possess them and that if a state which
possessed electric power could be compelled to share a certain quantity of its power
with another state, the same principle should be applied to states which possess coal
mines, diamond mines or any kind of natural resources. League of Nations Doc. C. 30.M.
16 at 8, 9 (1924) (Convention Relating to the Development of Hydraulic Power
Affecting More than One State: Records and Texts). As a result, the draft provision
was replaced by a provision placing an obligation on the parties to enter into negotia-
tions. 36 L.N.T.S. 77, Arts. 1, 3, 4, (1923). This obligation was emasculated by
Article 1:
The present Convention in no way affects the right belonging to each state,
within the limits of international law, to carry out on its own territory any
operations for the development of hydraulic power which it may consider
desirable.
No clarification of the "limits of international law" was made.
25. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434, 435 (1920).
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exploitation of coal or diamond mines, the utilization of water resources
within the boundaries of one riparian can inflict serious damages on the
other riparians. Both lower and upper riparians are vulnerable to
injuries. Following an upper diversion of a river, a lower riparian might
be exposed to reduction in its water supplies; conversely, following a
lower damming of the river, an upper riparian might be exposed to
inundation of its territory.2"
The above arguments go beyond weakening the analogy between
international rivers and other natural resources. They manifest the
unreasonableness and the injustice which stem from application of the
territorial supremacy doctrine to international rivers. In fact, acknowledg-
ment of such principle would be tantamount to legitimation of a riparian's
right to take away the rivers of other riparians, to inflict damage by
depriving agricultural communities of their source of livelihood and to
obstruct the operation of power plants to the frustration of industrial
activities.
The injustice involved in the doctrine becomes all the more glaring
when the deprivation of a riparian's water resources results in over-
abundance in the depriving riparian. If riparians' rights in the river are
unlimited, there is no legal impediment to prevent riparians from exploit-
ing the river resources solely at their own convenience. Such results
clearly indicate that the application of the territorial supremacy doctrine
is not conducive to the prevention of international friction, a goal which
is the raison d'etre of international law.
"Territorial supremacy" is also objectionable as a principle since it
detrimentally affects efficient utilization of resources. Experts in the field
of river basin development recognize that:
Individual water projects-whether single or multipurpose--can-
not as a rule be undertaken with optimum benefit for the people
affected before there is at least the broad outlines of a plan for
the entire drainage area. Integrated river basin development
with the aim stated [making optimum use of the water re-
26. The extent of the potential injuries can be illustrated by the conclusions
drawn by David E. Lilienthal from a fact-finding tour through an area in Pakistan
from which India had temporarily withheld water supplies:
Pakistan includes some of the most productive food growing lands in the world
in Western Punjab (the Kipling country) and the Sind. But without water for
irrigation this would be desert, 20,000,000 acres would dry up in a week, tens
of millions would starve. No army, with bombs and shellfires, could devastate
a land as thoroughly as Pakistan could be devastated by the simple expendience
of India permanently shutting off the source of water that keeps the fields
and the people of Pakistan alive. India has never threatened such a drastic
step, and indeed, denies any such intention-but the power is there nonetheless.
COLLIER'S, Aug. 4, 1951, at 58.
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sources] involves the coordinated and harmonious development
of the various works in relation to all the reasonable pos-
sibilities of the basin."
Under the territorial supremacy doctrine, each riparian legitimately could
embark on a unilateral uncoordinated, development project which might
result not only in harm to other riparians but also in a mutually detri-
mental conflict of projects.
The detrimental effect of territorial supremacy was demonstrated in
the recent Indo-Pakistan dispute. The partition of Punjab in 1947 into
India and Pakistan according to religious divisions cut through the middle
of the areas of highly developed irrigation systems. This division gave
rise to a prolonged dispute between the two countries over the supplies
of water for the canals leading from India to Pakistan and to a more
general controversy over the use of the waters of the Indus and its
tributaries. When protracted negotiations between the two governments
proved futile, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment offered its good offices and submitted to the two governments the
plan for "Development and Use of the Indus Basin Waters of February
5, 1954."" 8 This plan was embodied, with some modifications, in the
Indus Water Treaty of 1960, between India, Pakistan and the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development.29 The treaty provided
for separation of the water supply system of the two countries."0 All the
waters of the eastern rivers (Sutlej, Beas and Ravi) would be available
for the unrestricted use of India. Pakistan would be allowed unrestricted
use of all the waters of the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab)."1
The essential features of the plan were the allocation of each of the
rivers to one of the parties for its almost exclusive use and the con-
struction of replacement canal systems made necessary by such allocation.
These features reflect the parties' mistrust of each other in regard to
cooperative exploitation of their common rivers and their wish to control
27. INTEGRATED RIVER BASIN DEVELOPMENT: REPORT BY A PANEL OF EXPERTS
[hereinafter cited as INTEGRATED RIVER DEVELOPMENT.], U.N. Doc. E/3066 at 1 (1958).
28. For discussion of the dispute, the role played by the International Bank and the
agreement reached by the disputants, see generally, A. MIcHEL, THE INDus RIVmRs: A
STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF PARTITION 195-268 (1967).
29. 419 U. N. T. S. 126. For a discussion of the treaty, see Rajan, The Indus
Treaty i96o, 1 INDIAN J. INeL' L. 655-58 (1961).
30. Once the transition period was over, the two countries could go their
separate ways; no further agreements and no continual consensus was essential.
A. MICHEL, supra note 28, at 239.
31. 419 U.N.T.S. 126, Arts. II, III. Some exceptions were made to the above
divisions of the water supply, and a transition period of ten years was provided for
adaptation. The parties agreed that "[niothing in this Treaty shall be construed by the
parties as in any way establishing any general principle of law or any precedent."
Id. at Art. XI (2).
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independently their water supplies. In a sense, rejection of unified
development in the Indus Basin in favor of independent planning and
operation of the water supplies reflects the notion of recourse to sovereign
right. This approach was found by the International Bank to be reason-
able in view of prolonged Indo-Pakistani tensions. 2 From the economic
point of view, however, the plan was found to be exceedingly expensive
and inefficient in the utilization of water resources."3 The plan was also
deficient from the point of view of an overall settlement of competing
claims. Possible future upstream withdrawls by China or Afghanistan
were not considered in the plan despite the fact that Afghan projects on
the Kabul River (a tributary of the Indus River which contributes about
16 per cent of the waters of the basin) were known already to be under
construction. 4
The Indus basin plan differs from the normal recourse to territorial
sovereignty, since it was established by agreement. However, both the
need for the agreement and its content arose out of the parties' mutual
suspicions of unrestricted withdrawals. If the parties' suspicions could
have been removed by binding principles of international law restraining
utilization of international rivers, they might have been able to agree on a
plan of efficient integrated river basin development.
Thus, the territorial supremacy principle is objectionable because of
the possible injustice which can be involved in its application and its
impediment to progressive regulation of international rivers.
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
The argument of "injurious effects" employed to reject the territorial
supremacy doctrine embodies the essence of the territorial integrity
doctrine. This doctrine was used in the Charter of the United Nations,
which instructs the members of the organization to "refrain ... from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity ... of any state, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations." 3 The application of this principle to international rivers is
summarized in Oppenheim's International Law:
But the flow of not-national, boundary and international rivers
is not within the arbitrary power of one of the riparian states,
for it is a rule of International Law that no state is allowed to
32. A. MICHEL, supra note 28, at 232-36.
33. This appraisal is based on a conversation with Gilbert F. White, Department
of Geography, University of Chicago.
34. See Hirsch, Utilization of International Rivers in the Middle East, 50 Am.
INTI L. 81, 98 (1956).
35. U. N. CHARTER Art. 2, para. 4.
RIPARIAN COMPETITION
alter the natural conditions of its own territory to the dis-
advantage of the natural conditions of the territory of a neigh-
boring state. For this reason a state is not only forbidden to stop
or divert the flow of a river which runs from its own to a neigh-
boring state, but likewise to make such use of the water of the
river as either causes danger to the neighboring state or pre-
vents it from making proper use of the flow of the river on its
party2
Oppenheim considered the duty of a state not to interfere with the
flow of a river to the detriment of other riparians to stem also from the
doctrine of the abuse of rights, according to which a state is under an
obligation not to "[avail] itself of its right in an arbitrary manner
in such a way as to inflict upon another state an injury which cannot be
justified by a legitimate consideration of its own advantage."' 7
The first step in the efforts of international lawyers to outline the
tenets of international river law was taken by the Institut de Droit
International at its Madrid Congress of 1911. The Congress, noting the
need to remedy the lack of rules of international law with respect to the
use of international rivers, arrived at conclusions similar to those of
Oppenheim."8 The rules laid down at the conference distinguished
between boundary streams and streams which traverse successively the
territories of two or more states. With regard to boundary streams, it was
provided that no state may, in its own territory, utilize the river in such
a way as to "seriously interfere with its utilization by the other state."' "s
With regard to successive streams, it was provided that the point where
these streams cross the frontier of two states may not be changed "with-
out the consent" of the riparians. Furthermore, "no establishment (especi-
ally factories using hydraulic power) may take so much water that the
constitution, otherwise called utilizable or essential character, of the
stream shall, when it reaches the territory downstream, be seriously
modified."4
A recent comparative study of domestic legal systems by F. J.
Berber concluded that no general principle according to which a riparian
cannot exercise its rights when it would damage another riparian existed
36. I. OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, at 474, 475.
37. Id. at 345.
38. The text of the resolution is reported in 24 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 365-67 (1911). The resolution is cited in English in LEGAL
PROBLEIMIS RELATING TO THE UTILIZATION AND USE OF INTERNATIONAL IVERS: REPORT
OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL [hereinafter cited as: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL], 3 U.N. Doc. A/5409 at 515-17 (1963).
39. 3 U.N. Doc. A/5409, Art. I, at 516.
40. Id. Art. II (3).
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in the national law of the individual states.4 ' The only rule drawn from
the comparison as being common to all civilized states was that "no one
may exercise his rights in such a manner as to damage another when the
causing of this damage is the purpose, the motive, perhaps the only
motive, for the exercise of such rights."42 Similarly, the comparison be-
tween the systems of municipal water law did not lead to the abstraction
of any general and definite rule.4" However, an indefinite rule was found
to underlie most of these systems according to which "the user must in
some way take into consideration the use of waters by other users." 4
The positive element which unifies all the rules is an affirmative
recognition of existing international duties on the part of riparians to
international rivers. The arbitrary utilization of a river is limited by
consideration of its effects on other riparians. But in comparison with the
definite and self-executing qualities of the territorial supremacy doctrine,
the territorial integrity theory does not present a clear criterion as to the
extent of the effects which are disallowed or as to the way to establish the
occurrence of such effects. Limitations upon the use of rivers on such
grounds as it "causes danger," "prevents from making proper use,"
"is detrimental," or "seriously modifies the essential character of the
stream" are susceptible to controversial interpretations. A question arises
as to who is the authority to decide these controversies: the effecting
riparian, the affected riparian or another third body? Moreover, the
principle is oriented toward safeguarding the interests of lower riparians
without giving due consideration to the interests of the upper riparians.
The weakness of this approach is illustrated by the use by riparians of an
inundation system of irrigation. Such irrigation systems often result in
large supplies of water being wasted. Under a different and more efficient
irrigation system, much less water would be needed to irrigate the
equivalent areas. However, if the wasted supplies were to be consumed by
the development projects of an upper riparian, such use might be con-
sidered detrimental to the less efficient lower riparian and therefore
41. F. BERBER, supra note 3, at 209.
42. Id. at 210.
43. Id. at 253-54.
44. Id. at 254. A survey of water treaties led Berber to conclude that no general
principle of law could be extracted from this source. However, with regard to regional
customary law, he found that:
[the] continental European treaties agree with each other in requiring the
the consent of the other riparian state for works likely to affect materially the
flow of water in that state. But apart from this there does not appear to be any
general rule. Sometimes the provisions relate only to a short stretch of common
waters in the strict sense, sometimes only boundary waters (and sometimes this
expression includes tributary streams, sometimes it excludes tributary streams),
sometimes all common waters without any restriction.
Id. at 155, 156.
RIPARIAN COMPETITION
illegitimate. In this respect, the doctrine may be viewed as inconsiderate
of upper riparian interests and inhibitive of efficient utilization of water
resources.
The problems inherent in the territorial integrity doctrine were
apparent in the Franco-Spanish dispute known as L'affaire du lac
Lanox.45 Lake Lanox lies wholly within France and is fed by streams
arising in and crossing only French territory. It is drained by the River
Font-vive, which is a source of the Carol River. The Carol River flows
from France into Spain where it empties into the River Segre.
From 1917 to 1957, France and Spain were unable to come to terms
on the question of France's right to proceed with the utilization of the
waters of Lake Lanox. France contemplated using Lake Lanox as a
reservoir and then diverting its waters to the basin of the River Ariege
(a wholly French river), where it could profit by a precipitous drop foF
the production of electric energy. This project would have enabled France
to produce enough electricity to serve a city of 326,000 inhabitants
throughout the year. The planned diversion amounted to twenty-five
per cent of the entire flow of the Carol, the water of which was used in
Spain by 18,000 farmers. French proposals to compensate Spain took
several forms. The first proposal provided for monetary indemnity for the
losses to be suffered. France then provided for the return to the Carol
River of a flow adequate to meet "Spain's real needs." A later proposal
suggested the return of an amount of water equivalent to the full inflow
at Lake Lanox with supervision opportunities to a Spanish representative,
enabling him to verify that equivalent returns were actually being made.
Spain rejected the French proposals, claiming that France could not
lawfully change in its territory the natural course of a river flowing into
Spain without the prior consent of Spain, even though the flow at the
border was to remain unchanged, and that the contemplated change in the
river course would subject to French control the flow of the water into
Spain."8 The dispute was resolved in favor of France by an arbitral
award given in 1957-forty years after its inception.
The Spanish contention adopted the territorial integrity principle to
disallow any change in the river course without its consent. However, its
physical integrity was not actually threatened, since France guaranteed
the return of at least the same amount diverted and provided for oppor-
45. For discussion of this case see generally Laylin and Bianchi, The Role of
Adjudication in Intervational River Disputes: The Lake Lanox Case 53 Am. J. I 'L L.
30 (1959); Griffin, The Use of Waters of International Drainage Basins under
Customary International Law, id. at 50; Machensey, Judicial Decisions, id. at 156.
46. 62 REvuE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 79, 102-03 (1958), cited in
English in REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, supra note 38, at 500-01.
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tunities to verify its compliance with this obligation. Spain did not even
claim that the quality of the water would be changed by the contemplated
project. The only deterimental effect Spain could point to was the subjec-
tion of the river flow to French control and will. The French project
would have had an effect on the control of the flow, but the change would
be in degree only, since France already posesssed control as an upper
riparian. Thus, a claim based on an insubstantial effect paralyzed French
development projects for forty years.
Water control usually takes the form of changing its distribution in
time and place.4" The change in distribution can be worked out to the
benefit of all riparians on the basis of an efficient, coordinated develop-
ment project. But a beneficial change in the distribution of the waters of
an international river can be challenged by any riparian which refuses to
coordinate its projects on the ground that its territorital integrity is
being violated.
The orientation of the territorial integrity principle toward safe-
guarding riparian interests from detrimental changes can operate to negate
beneficial development of international river basins. In this respect, the
application of the principle is an impediment to progressive regulation
of international rivers.
UNITY OF THE RIVER BASIN
WAhile territorial supremacy is concerned with the benefits accuring
to riparians from their sovereign faculties, and territorial integrity is
concerned with the detrimental effects which might be inflicted upon other
riparians, there is a third doctrine which is concerned with the impact of
both the benefits and detriments on all the riparians in an international
river basin. In contrast to the two former doctrines which treated sep-
arately the segments of the river passing through the territories of each
riparian, the new doctrine starts with the premise of the unity of the river
basin.
The first principle of international law adopted by the New York
Conference of the International Law Association in September 1958
stated:
A system of rivers and lakes in a drainage basin should
be treated as an integrated whole (and not piece-meal)."4
The origin of the above principle can be traced to the 1911 Madrid Con-
47. INTEGRATED RIVER DEVELOPMENT, supra note 27, at 3.
48. INTERNATIONAL LAW AssOcIATIoN, supra note 7.
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ference of the Institute du Droit International which provided in its
statement of reasons that:
Riparian states with a common stream are in a position of
permanent physical dependence on each other which precludes
the idea of the complete autonomy of each state in the section of
the natural watercourse under its sovereignty.
4 9
Although this Congress appreciated the interdependence between the river
sections to the exclusion of complete autonomy of various sections, the
deduction of commensurate conclusions did not occur until fifty years
later in the Salzburg session of the Institute in September 1961. The
resolution adopted at this session stated in its preamble:
Considering that the economic importance of the use of waters
is transformed by modem technology and that application of
modern technology to the waters of a hydrographic basin which
includes the territory of several states affects in general all these
states....
Considering that in the utilization of waters of interest to
several states, each of them can obtain, by consultation, by
plans established in common and by reciprocal concessions,
the advantages of a more rational exploitation of a natural
resource.... °
On the basis of these and other considerations, the session resolved to
recognize the right of each riparian to utilize the waters of international
rivers on an equitable basis.5
To view the river as a physical unity is to reject territorial sove-
reignty or integrity. The unity principle does not allow territorial claims
to shape the right to utilize the waters of international rivers. Instead, it
provides that the river as a whole should be utilized to benefit the com-
munities served without the hindrance of priorities claimed by upper or
lower riparians.
A firm advocate for the use of the river unity theory is H. A. Smith:
The first principle is that every river system is naturally an
indivisible physical unit, and that as such it should be developed
so as to render the greatest possible service to the whole human
community which it serves, whether or not that community is
49. 24 -ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 365 (1911), cited in
English in the REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, supra note 38, at 513.
50. 49 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, pt. 2, at 381 (1961).
51. Id. Art. 3 at 382.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
divided into two or more political jurisdictions. It is the positive
duty of every government concerned to cooperate to the extent
of its power in promoting this development.... ."
Three elements in the above statement should be emphasized. Plans for
the development of water resources should be calculated to optimize the
benefits of the river. There is a duty of governments to cooperate in
promoting such development. This development should not be subjected
to political boundaries. There is no doubt that the combination of these
three elements is designed to bring the maximum benefit to the com-
munity surrounding the river as a whole; hence, any progressive regula-
tion of international rivers should include these elements. Adoption of
such an approach raises the intricate dilemma of mediation between the
above elements and the interests of the political entities comprising the
community of the river. Specifically, it raises the question of allocating
benefits and concessions between the riparians of an international river
basin.
Smith continues by delineating the relation between the beneficial
development approach and the interests of the political entities. He admits
that the government concerned:
. . . cannot be called upon to imperil any vital interest or to
sacrifice without full compensation and provision for security
[of] any other particular interest of its own, whether political,
strategic, or economic, which the law of nations recognizes as
legitimate."3
Since friction between riparians ordinarily occurs when they have
important interests at stake, the concession admitted by Smith detracts
considerably from the efficacy of the beneficial development approach. A
few observations should be made about the interests involved and their
satisfaction.
To begin with, there is growing concern over the availability of
water resources in the world. A report prepared by a panel of experts
for the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations concluded
that :
The steady growth in world population and a growing water
consciousness have increased the demand for water, conse-
quently, its value with every indication that the value will
continue to increase."
52. H. SMITH, supra note 16, at 150-51.
53. Id. at 151.
54. INTEGRATED RIVER DEVELOPMENT, supra note 27, at 32.
RIPARIAN COMPETITION
Possibilities for water use are in many cases irreconcilable. Dis-
tinction should be made between consumptive uses and non-consumptive
ones. Consumptive uses are those in which the water is wholly or largely
used up, such as irrigation, industrial processing and to a certain extent
domestic use. Non-consumptive uses are those in which the physical
quantity of the water is undiminished, such as generation of hydraulic
power and navigation. Consumptive uses are mutually exclusive, and in
a sense the same is true of non-consumptive uses in competiton with con-
sumptive uses. Water used for generation of power in the downstream
level is no longer available for withdrawal at the upstream level, and
waters used for navigation cannot, beyond a certain minimum, be used
for other purposes. Yet, multiple use of a watercourse is sometimes
possible.5 In these cases, greater opportunties lie in a unit-basin approach.
In cases of irreconcilable uses, the common remedy of monetary
compensation is rarely adequate, at least until artificial production of
usable water (whether by desalination process, cloud seeding or
otherwise) becomes economically feasible. Illustrative of this point is the
dispute between the United States and Canada over the Columbia River.
Monetary compensation proved to be inadequate to resolve this dispute,
although the Boundary Water Treaty of 1909"6 (in force between the
two parties) provided for a right of action for damages when injuries
were caused by "any interference with or diversion from their natural
channels of such waters on either side of the boundary.""7 In 1951 the
United States applied to the International Joint Commission (created by
the above mentioned treaty) for approval of a contemplated Libby Dam
to be built on the central point of Kootenay River, where the river dips
briefly into the United States. The proposed dam would have raised the
water level at the border some 150 feet, thereby creating a large storage
reservoir extending forty-two miles into Canada, rendering communica-
tion between certain Canadian communities more difficult. The United
States offered to compensate the Canadians for the lands flooded, for
highway and railway relocations and for resettlement of displaced
persons. 8 Canada rejected the offer and insistently claimed that it was
entitled to share the Libby power in return for the physical contribution
of her natural resources. Protests by the United States that the demand
for a share of Libby power and other downstream benefits was con-
55. Id. at 4.
56. Convention Concerning the Boundary Waters with Canada, Jan. 11, 1909,
36 Stat. 2448, T. S. No. 546.
57. Id. Art. 2 at 2608.
58. Johnson, The Canada-United States Controversy Over the Columbia River, 41
WAS H. L. Rav. 676, 713 (1966).
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trary to the 1909 Treaty, which provided only monetary compensation,
were to no avail."9 The dispute was resolved by the 1961 Columbia
River Treaty" which provided inter alia for equal sharing of increased
dependable capacity and average energy at United States head plants on
the Columbia downstream reaches.6'
The possibilities of irreconcilable water uses, the inadequacy of
monetary indemnity to compensate for losses of water benefits and the
increased demand for water resources create a growing number of situa-
tions in which the common sharing of water resources involves a conflict
between riparian interests. Any theory that restrains the beneficial
development approach by requiring non-interference with particular in-
terests of riparians is likely to impede rational exploitation of water
resources. Therefore, a different theory based on the unity of the river
basin concept should be employed for allocating water resources. The
concept of equitable apportionment provides the basis for such a theory.
EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT
The equitable apportionment concept can best be understood by
analysis on three levels: technical, international and federal.
59. Id. at 714.
60. Treaty with Canada Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water
Resources of the Columbia River Basin, January 17, 1961, T.I.A.S. No. 5638 (effective
Sept. 16, 1964).
61. The Columbia Treaty provides that:
Canada is obligated to provide 15.5 million acre-feet of storage in the High
Arrow Lakes, Duncan Lake, and Mica Creek reservoirs to be operated
predominantly to meet flood management and power objectives in the United
States. The flowage rights in Canada required for the headwaters of the Libby
reservoir, with damsite located in the United States, are to be provided by
Canada as well, should the United States elect to build the Libby project.
In exchange for the Stream regulation provided by the Canadian storages,
the United States agreed to share equally the increase in dependable capacity and
average energy at United States head plants on the U.S. reaches of the Columbia
downstream, and to advance payment in amounts equal to one-half the estimated
damage reduction in the flood plain of the lower Columbia. This sum dis-
counted to the year 1964 was estimated to be approximately $54 million.
Although Canada initially elected to have its downstream power share returned
for use in British Columbia, it ultimately opted to sell such power entitlement,
parts of which commence in 1968, 1969, and 1973. for $254 million (U.S. 1964
worth). In addition, according to the terms of the Treaty, the United States
will provide stream regulation having a net present value of approximately
$60 million from its Libby project for Canadian head plants downstream on the
lower Kootenay in Canada.
Krutilla, The International Columbia River Treaty: An Economic Evalnation in
WATER RESEARcH 69, 70 (A. Kneese and S. Smith ed. 1966). Krutilla suggests that
"[I]t might be expected that the benefits from the Columbia Treaty would not be
divided equally, but only that some net advantage could accrue to the United States."
Id. at 84.
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The Technical Approach
On the technical level, the starting point for treating international
river basins is the concept of integrated river basin development, which is
defined as the "orderly marshalling of water resources of river basins for
multiple purposes to promote human welfare."62 Applying this concept to
international river basins would mean that "[t]he waters therein should
be developed to provide the optimum benefit to the community within the
basin, whether or not it comes under a single jurisdiction." 8
A panel of experts was established by the Secretary-General, acceding
to the request of the Economic and Social Council, to deal with the
economic and social implications of integrated river basin development and
to advise proper action. The panel, after elaborating the features of an
integrated river basin development, suggested a way to mediate between
this concept and the difficulties encountered in cooperation between
political entities. Viewing the extent of riparian cooperation as influencing
considerably the degree of success in carrying out any development pro-
ject, the panel delineated a sequence of steps to bring about an atmos-
phere of cooperation between the concerned riparians, beginning with the
less explosive subjects, such as exchange of data and exploration of the
physical possibilities, and ultimately reaching the issue of allocation.
Characteristic of the panel's approach is the following statement: "It is
emphasized that the representatives would come together to cooperate in
planning, not to settle international disputes.""4 Imperative to the success
of this approach is the formulation of a clear statement of the benefits to
be derived from the project, thereby providing the riparians an incentive
for cooperation. 5
The preparation of the comprehensive plan will naturally raise
a great variety of issues, all of which have to be analyzed and
settled in a spirit of give and take. What must emerge is a plan
that exhibits two main features, first, a fair deal for all rather
than a good bargain for one, and second, obvious benefits, direct
and indirect, to all although the benefits can hardly be equal.68
The suggested basis for allocation is thus a "fair deal" and "obvious
benefits" to all. The panel did not elaborate further, presumably because
it approached the question of benefit allocation by delineating a friction-
reducing process designed to promote a cooperative atmosphere in bar-
62. INTEGRATED RIVER DEVELOPMENT, supra note 27 at 1.
63. Id. at 32.
64. Id. at 36.
65. Id. at 32.
66. Id. at 37.
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gaining sessions, the outcome of which should provide a fair deal and
obvious benefits to all parties. The determination of a fair deal was left,
however, to be decided by the riparians' negotiations.
The Modern International Legal Approach
Efforts have been made recently toward the formulation and system-
atization of legal principles applicable to users of international rivers.
These legal efforts were directed at replacing the traditional one-sided
concepts with new principles based on mutuality. The principles enun-
ciated by three international law institutes are worth considering in this
respect.
The Institut de Droit International at its Salzburg Session in
September 1961 recognized the existence in international law of a re-
stricted right of every state to utilize the waters which traverse or border
its territory. It was further states that:
If the states are in disagreement over the scope of their rights
of utilization, settlement will take place on the basis of equity,
taking particular account of their respective needs as well as of
other pertinent circumstances.1
7
The International Law Association at its forty-eighth conference
held in New York in 1958 stated some principles of international law
governing the uses of the waters of drainage basins within the territories
of two or more states, including:
Except as otherwise provided by treaty or other instruments or
customs binding upon the parties, each co-riparian state is en-
titled to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses
of the waters of the drainage basins. What amounts to a reason-
able and equitable share is a question to be determined in the
light of all the relevant factors in each particular case.68
The Helsinki conference of the Association in 1966 added to the above
principle a list of relevant factors, not considered to be exhaustive,
including: the physical conditions of the basin, the past and existing
utilization of the basin, the riparians' economic and social needs, the
satisfaction of these needs by alternative means, and the compensation of
riparians as a means of adjusting conflicts among uses."
The Tenth Conference of the Inter-American Bar Association at
67. 49 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, pt. 2, Art. 2, at 382
(1961).
68. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, supra note 7, Art. 2, at IX.
69. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOciATION, supra note 10, at 488.
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Buenos Aires in November 1957 enunciated the existence in international
law of the equal rights of riparians to make use of the "system of
international waters. 170 It was further stated that:
States having under their jurisdiction a part of a system of
international waters are under a duty, in the application of the
principle of equality of rights, to recognize the right of the other
states having jurisdiction over a part of the system to share the
benefits of the system, taking as the basis the right of each
state to the maintenance of the status of its existing beneficial
uses and to enjoy, according to the relative needs of the
respective states, the benefits of future developments. 71
All the above principles were concerned with defining the basis for
allocation of the water resources but, despite the awareness of the
advantages offered by a regional approach to development of international
river basins, the above mentioned institutions formulated no principle of
international law to that effect. However, the issue was touched upon in
the context of recommendations reflecting the desirability of establishing
common organs to deal with the problems arising out of common use and
with facilitating the economic utilization of the river. 2
Under the above principles, allocation of water resources is not
subject to claims based on territorial assertions but rests instead upon the
recognition of riparians' equal rights to equitable allocations. Although
the three definitions are not identical, when read together they convey
the modern approach of equitable apportionment based on consideration
of all "relevant" or "pertinent" circumstances with particular attention
given to the riparians' respective needs and their prior appropriations.
The criterion of equitable apportionment is a point of departure in the
sense that it negates claims based on the sovereignty and the integrity
concepts, but it is incapable of being cast in the language of a definite
formula. The three institutions made specific reference to respective needs
and prior apportionment as being factors to be weighed in the balance. A
few observations should be made with regard to these factors.
The need for water is a relative concept vulnerable to controversial
interpretations. The indefinite character of the concept of need for water
has been recognized on the state level:
70. INTER-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, I PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH CONFERENCE
HELD AT BUENOS AIRES FROTM 14 TO 21 NOVEMBER 1957, Art. 1 (1958), cited in REPORT OF
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, supra note 38, at 544.
71. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, supra note 38, Art. 2 at 544.
72. See ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, supra note 38, Art. 9 at
389; INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, supra note 7, Art. 4 of the Agreed Recommenda-
tions at ix; REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, supra note 38, Art. III (a), at 545.
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The idea of "needs" or "requirements" for water has an appeal-
ing ring of calculable definiteness about it as compared with the
connotation of words like "demands," "claims," or "desires."
But in fact, the former mean nothing more than the latter. A
man has a certain physiological need for water to survive.
Beyond this more water will improve his health and well-being,
still more permits him to wash and cook, and so on down the
line through the use of waters for irrigation and industry,
gardening and air conditioning, etc.
Finally, even if any sense could be made of the idea that men
"need" water in certain calculable amounts, it could not be
inferred that regions "need" water since men will choose what
regions they desire to live in on the basis of water availability
combined with all other considerations. Thus, the water avail-
able per square mile in the Sahara Desert is much less than in
the urban area of New York, but we do not hear much of the
"needs" of the former region. The reason is that man has
adapted to the fact that water is an extremely scarce commodity
in the Sahara, and consequently only those limited human
activities capable of coping with this fact can be carried on there.
Since "needs" for water are indefinitely expandable, there will
always be competition for the use of existing supplies.7"
An analogy drawn from water supply on the state level is not
wholly applicable to water supply on the international level. The premise
of men choosing the regions in which they desire to live on the basis of
water availability is not valid for dwellers in desert states. It is certainly
untrue that the political entity of a state can choose the regions it desires
to live in. However, the premise that "water needs" is an indefinite
concept is certainly valid.
The expansive character of the need for water gives rise to contro-
versial interpretations of the concept. Are agricultural and industrial uses
to be included among the components of water needs or only domestic
and sanitary uses; is the saturation point of water needs to be measured
according to the standards of countries fairly abundant with water
resources and doing well economically; should all riparians' water needs
be equally measured by the same standards? Presumably, resolution of
the above issues upon an equitable basis must consider all the relevant
circumstances. Consequently, standards adopted on such a basis would be
73. J. HIRSHLEIFER, J. DEHAvEN, & J. MILLIMAN, WATER SUPPLY: EcoNomiCS,
TECHNOLOGY, AND POLICY 34, 35 (1966).
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specific to the circumstances existent in a certain international river basin,
and therefore no generalization of standards can be laid down for the
"respective needs" of riparians.
Prior appropriations, the second specified factor to be weighed in
determining equitable apportionment, embodies the principle "that priority
of appropriation gives superiority of right." 4 The resolution of the Inter-
American Bar Association provided that the basis of each riparian's right
to share in the benefits of the river is the "maintenance of the status of its
existing beneficial uses." The relative needs of the riparian would be
taken into account only with respect to the benefits of future develop-
ments. In contrast with the above resolution, the principles enunciated by
the Institut de Droit International and by the New York Conference of
the International Law Association did not specify prior appropriations
as a factor to be considered in the apportionment but referred generally
to all other relevant and pertinent circumstances. The Helsinki Conference
of the International Law Association did refer specifically to prior ap-
propriations but only as one of the factors bearing on the equitable
apportionment of the benefits. Thus the statements of the latter two
institutions imply a denial of the ascendancy of prior appropriations but
not a disavowal of its relevancy to the balance of the overall equities of a
given case.
The priority of appropriation rule has both positive and negative
aspects. If, for example, a riparian has built a multi-purpose dam and is
operating a hydroelectric plant, it would hardly be equitable to suggest a
study of potential uses of the river which ignores the existence of the
dam. The objection raised by the United States to a contemplated Cana-
dian project diverting water from the Columbia River relied on the
potential injuries to the various uses of the existing dams in the United
States.75 On the other hand, acknowledgment of wasteful senior uses,
like the inundation system of irrigation which has been practiced in the
Nile and the Indus basins, hardly justifies a rule of priority of appropria-
tion. The disadvantage inherent in this rule was pointed out by the United
Nations Panel of Experts:
74. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 470 (1921).
75. Under the Fraser Diversion Scheme, contemplated by Canada in 1950, water
from the Columbia was to be diverted into the Fraser River. Under this plan, the
Kootenay was also to be diverted. The United States claimed that Grand Coulee Dam
needed all the natural flow of the Columbia to keep its storage reservoirs full and its
generators in full operation. It was argued that during a low-flow year there would be a
direct conflict between Grand Coulee operation and the proposed diversion. The critical
winter months, when the Grand Coulee reservoir should be filling, would be the same
period when the Columbia waters would be drained off into the Fraser diversion. See
Johnson, supra note 58, at 716-17.
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'Historic uses' and 'priority of appropriations' have, in many
cases, come to have an almost sacred significance, irrespective
of the actual benefits derived, or whether the water is being
put to the best use. 6
The Indus Commission which recommended in 1942 the gradual
replacement of the inundation system by weir controlled irrigation in
order to save the wasted supplies took the position that until such changes
take place the existing irrigation uses must be protected.77 Thereafter,
the existing uses were to be measured by the benefits previously accrued
rather than the previous amounts of water used in order to adjust the
priority of appropriations rule to an equitable approach.
Changes other than the technological ones, such as a natural change
in the water resources, changes in the population surrounding it and its
economy, might also render a strict application of the priority of ap-
propriations rule inequitable.
Application of the rule might cause further injustice in cases where
there is an economic and techonological gap between the concerned ripar-
ians. Owing to technological advancement and financial abilities a riparian
might acquire vested rights in expansive water uses, leaving very little
for the time when other riparians will be technically and economically
capable of expanding their own water uses. In such cases, backward ripar-
ians substantially might lose their right to share the benefits of the river.
The Arab opposition to the Israeli diversion relied also on the reason that
Israel would thus be prevented from acquiring vested rights in the
waters."8
Since the equitable quality of the priority of appropriations rule is
conditioned upon the context in which it is applied, prior appropriations
should be considered as one among other factors comprising the equitable
balance rather than as a preponderant factor.
Another issue dependent for its solution on the specific conditions of
each river basin is the order of priorities among the different kinds of
uses. Since no two river systems are the same," the physical capabilities of
the river systems vary along with the various uses established and
required by the population surrounding them. Thus, no generalization
can be made for an order of precedence to be applicable to all situations.
76. INTEGRATED RIVER DEVELOPMENT, supra note 27, at 38.
77. AMERICAN BRANCH, INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, supra note 8, Appendix
D (Report of the Indus Commission [19421) at 97-99.
78. E. RIZK, THE RIVER JORDAN 37, 38 (The Arab Information Center, Informa-
tion Paper No. 23, 1964).
79. White, A Perspective of River Basin. Development, 22 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS 157, 160 (1957).
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This point was noted by the Helsinki conference of the International Law
Association in stating the following principle:
A use or category of uses is not entitled to any inherent
preference over any other use or category of uses."
The above observations indicate that, although the concepts of
respective needs and prior appropriations are relevant factors in the
allocation of water resources, their impact depends upon other pertinent
factors, and therefore they are of only limited aid in assessing the im-
plications of the equitable apportionment doctrine. Under the equitable
apportionment doctrine the question of what amounts to a reasonable and
equitable share must be determined in the light of the relevant factors in
each particular case.
The Federal Approach
The principles enunciated by the three international law institutes
mentioned above, reflect to a considerable extent the impact of decisions
rhached on the so-called quasi-international level, the federal or inter-
provincial level. The Supreme Court of the United States has had ample
opportunity to decide water disputes between the states.8 Controversies
between states are governed by federal, state and international law con-
sidered and applied "as the exigencies of the particular case may re-
quire." 2 The leading principle under which such disputes are setted is
equality of right which may be summarized as follows:
the principles of right and equity shall be applied having
regard to the 'equal level or plane on which all the states stand,
in point of power and right, under our constitutional system'
and that, upon a consideration of the pertinent laws of the
contending States and all other relevant facts, this Court [the
Supreme Court] will determine what is an equitable apportion-
ment of the use of such waters.83
The doctrine of territorial supremacy was rejected by the Supreme
Court:
The contention ... that ... a state rightfully may divert and
use, as she may choose, the waters flowing within her boundaries
in this interstate stream, regardless of any prejudice that this
may work to others having rights in the streahi beloiv her
80. INTmNATIONAL LAW AssocIATIoN, supra note 10, Art. 6, at 491. -
81. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (.1931).
82. Id. at 670.
83. Id. at 670, 671. See also Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 465, 470 (1921).
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boundary, cannot be maintained. The river throughout its course
in both states is but a single stream wherein each state has an
interest which should be respected by the other.8
Likewise, the territorial integrity doctrine in its strict sense was also
rejected:
The lower state is not entitled to have the stream flow as it
would in nature regardless of need or use. If, then, the upper
state is devoting the water to a beneficial use, the question to
be decided, in the light of existing conditions in both states, is
whether, and to what extent, her action injures the lower state
and her citizens by depriving them of a like, or an equally valu-
able, beneficial use.85
The Supreme Court has stated that the equitable apportionment
doctrine is the basis for water allocation between riparian states. Yet,
in applying this doctrine, the Court has occasionally resorted to the
priority of appropriation rule as representing the equitable allocation in a
particular case. The interrelation between these two principles can be
witnessed in the decisions rendered in the controversies of Wyoming v.
Colorado8" and Nebraska v. Wyoming."
In the first case, Wyoming instituted proceedings against Colorado
to prevent a proposed diversion in Colorado of part of the water of the
Laramie River which threatened to deprive Wyoming of water it had
been using for some time. The Court enjoined Colorado from diverting or
taking more than the residual supply of the river after deducting Wyom-
ing's senior appropriations, which were proved to be reasonably required
for the irrigation of land dependent on this water supply. The amount
sought to be diverted and taken under Colorado's diversion project was
much larger.88
The Court stated that the rule was "priority of appropriations gives
superiority of right."88 Moreover, it was held that this rule "furnishes the
only basis which is consonant with the principles of right and equity
applicable to such a controversy as this is."8" Application of the "priority
rule" in this controversy did not violate principles of right and equity
since,
84. 259 U.S. at 466.
85. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 393 (1943).
86. 259 U.S. 419.
87. 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
88. 259 U.S. at 496.
89. Id. at 470.
90. Id.
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[b]oth States pronounce[d] the rule [priority.] just and
reasonable as applied to the natural conditions in that region;
and to prevent any departure from it the people of both in-
corporated it into their constitutions. It originated in the
customs and usages of the people before either State came into
existence, and the courts of both hold that their constitutional
provisions are to be taken as recognizing the prior usage rather
than as creating a new rule.9'
Wyoming v. Colorado might be regarded as an endorsement of
"priority of appropriation" as a rule of law, but closer study reveals that
the decision rests on the "principles of right and equity" which in the
light of the specific circumstances of this controversy were expressed in
the terms of the priority rule. Nor does the opinion suggest that the
priority rule is the sole basis for deciding the rights of states following
such a rule in their municipal systems, since adoption of this Tule hinged
on the specific circumstances of the controversy and not on the fact that
the parties belonged to the category of "appropriation states."92
The foregoing analysis is in accord with Nebraska v. Wyoming,
involving the use of the North Platte River for irrigation. Nebraska
alleged that diversions in Wyoming and Colorado violated the priority
rule, which was in force in all three states, and deprived her of water to
which she was equitably entitled.
It was emphasized by the Court that the mere fact that the parties
were appropriation states did not necessitate a literal application of the
priority rule. The Court juxtaposed Wyoming v. Colorado and Colorado
v. Kansas,"3 which did not involve a controversy between two appropria-
tion states. The decision in the latter case provided that "all factors which
create equities in favor of one state or the other must be weighed"9 in
determining whether one state was using or threatening to use more than
its "equitable share." This observation led the Court to conclude that:
[I]f an allocation between appropriation States is to be just
and equitable, strict adherence to the priority rule may not be
possible. For example, the economy of a region may have been
established on the basis of junior appropriations. So far as
possible those established uses should be protected though strict
application of the priority rule might jeopardize them. Appor-
91. Id.
92. The Term "appropriation states" refers to these states which follow the
priority rule.
93. 320 U.S. 383 (1943).
94. Id. at 393-94.
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tionment calls for the exercise of an informed judgment on a
consideration of many factors. Priority of appropriation is
the guiding principle. But physical and climatic conditions,
the consumptive use of water in the several sections of the
river, the character and rate of return flows, the extent of
established uses, the availability of storage water, the practical
effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, the damage to
upstream areas as compared to the benefits to downstream areas
if a limitation is imposed on the former-these are all relevant
factors. They are merely illustrative, not an exhaustive cat-
alogue. They indicate the nature of the problem of apportion-
ment and the delicate adjustment of interests which must be
made. 5
The actual apportionment made by the Court did, under "counter-
vailing equities" in the factual context, deviate from the priority rule.
In summary, apportionment of interstate streams is based on the
principle of equity which takes into consideration prior appropriation,
efficiency of uses, benefits derived as compared with damages inflicted
and any other relevant factor. With regard to controversies between
appropriation states, the priority rule is only a guide the application of
which may be limited by the factual context.
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court were echoed in
the report of the Indus Commission. The Indus river system irrigates
more land than is irrigated in all the United States, yet there is still more
fertile land in the Indus basin than water to irrigate it. Agricultural
dependency upon this water resource gave rise to disputes between the
pre-partition princely states and the provinces inhabiting the basin. Until
1921 these disputes were resolved by the British Secretary of State for
India acting as an arbiter. Thereafter his authority passed to the Govern-
ment of India which acted on the advice of a central board of irrigation.
Under the Government of India Act, differences between the provinces, or
between the provinces and the princely states were to be resolved by a
central authority acting upon the advice of independent commissions.
Regulation of the water supply within the states was under the direct
authority of the rulers of those states. The Act of 1935 assigned to the
provinces authority to regulate their own water supplies.96
Under the Act of 1935 a lower riparian, Sind Province, brought a
95. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945).
96. See generally Laylin, Principles of Law Governing the Uses of International
Rivers, 1959 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCEEDINGS 20, 21-3; Bains.
supra note 19, at 45.
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complaint against an upper riparian, Punjab Province, in 1939, charging
that the river withdrawals for new Punjab projects would lower the water
level of the Indus River in Sind and would affect seriously the efficient
working of the Sind's inundation canals.9"
A commission was established to hear the dispute; other states and
provinces became parties and submitted their views. The chairman of the
Indus Commission was Sir Bengal N. Rau, then a judge of the Calcutta
High Court of justice and later a member of the International Court of
justice. The other two members were chief engineers from the provinces.
At the outset the commission issued a statement of principles of law
governing the rights of the states and provinces which were accepted
unanimously by the primary disputants and the five other states and
provinces which joined the proceedings. This statement, after pointing
out that the conclusion of agreements based on a community approach is
the most satisfactory settlement of disputes of this kind, provided that:
(3) If there is no such agreement, the rights of the several
Provinces and States must be determined by applying the
rule of 'equitable apportionment,' each unit getting a fair
share of the waters of the common river.
(4) In the general interests of the entire community inhabiting
dry, arid territories, priority may usually have to be given
to an earlier irrigation project over a later one: 'priority of
appropriation gives superiority of right.'
(5) For purposes of priority the date of a project is not the
date when a survey is first commenced, but the date when
the project reaches finality and there is a fixed and de-
finite purpose to take it up and carry it through.
(6) As between projects of different kinds for the use of water,
a suitable order of precedence might be: (a) use for
domestic and sanitary purposes; (b) use for navigation and
(c) use for power and irrigation. 8
With regard to the last mentioned principle, the Commission itself
made the observation that the order of precedence depends upon the
particular circumstances of the river concerned and that different author-
ities may take different views even with reference to the same river.
97. Laylin, supra note 96, at 23; see generally, A. MICHAEL, supra note 28, at
128-32.
98. I REPORT OF THE INDUS (RAU) ComiMIssIoN 10-11 (1942), cited in AMERICAN
BRANCi, INTERNATIONAL LAW AsSOCiATION, supra note 18, at 97-8.
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The imperative principle in this statement is the sharing of the water
on the basis of equitable apportionment. Yet, prior irrigation projects
are usually to be considered as the predominant factor. Determination of
priority according to the date on which the project is completed and not
when the surveying of the project was commenced avoids the possibility
of acquiring rights on the basis of uncertain or faked projects. But such
a principle may force riparians to speed up irrigation projects without
thorough consideration or due regard for economic priorities. More-
over, the principle might operate to deprive riparians who are oppressed
with economic or political problems of their "fair share of the water."
At the appropriate time these riparians might be unable to appro-
priate money for surveying or carrying out irrigation projects. In con-
trast, such results could be avoided if an appropriate body prepared at
least a broad outline of a development plan for the entire basin which
considered the projects to be carried out by each riparian.
With regard to the dispute itself, the Commission pointed out the
inequitable situation of Sind wasting the water supply by practicing an
inundation system while opposing Punjab's plan to utilize a fraction of
the wasted supplies for irrigation of land which laid barren for lack of
water. In view of this situation, the Commission recommended converting
Sind's inundation canals to weir-controlled canals to be fed from diver-
sion barrages. These would allow both the operation of the contemplated
Bhakra Dam in Punjab and the preservation of irrigation formerly
dependent upon Sind's inundation canals. It was further recommended
that Punjab contribute to the cost of the diversion barrages in order to
avoid having to pay compensation for which it would be liable in the
event the inundation canals had remained unconverted to weir control.
The recommendation of the Commission was subsequently incorporated
into a draft agreement between Sind and Punjab. This agreement never
came into effect, however, because the partition of India took place before
resolution of differences over Punjab's financial contribution to Sind's
diversion barrages. Since the partition, India has gone forward with the
construction of the Bhakra Dam, and West Pakistan has been working on
two Sind barrages.9"
The equitable approach to the allocation of water supply between
riparians was also adopted by the German Staatsgerichtshof in W'urt-
temberg and Prussia v. Baden.1"' The court said:
99. Laylin, supra note 96, at 25-6.
100. German Staatsgerichtshof, June 18, 1927, cited in A. McNair and H.
Lauterpacht, 4 ANNUAL DIGEST OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES 128 (1927, 1928).
In Wurtenberg and Prussia v. Baden, a dispute arose between Wurtenberg and Baden
over the effect of proposed projects on the flow of the Danube. These two parties
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The exercise of sovereign rights by every state in regard to
international rivers traversing its territory is limited by the
duty not to injure the interests of other members of the inter-
national community. Due consideration must be given to one
another by states through whose territories there flows an inter-
national river. No state may substantially impair the natural use
of the flow of such a river by its neighbor. . . The application
of this principle is governed by the circumstances of each
particular case. The interests of the states in question must be
weighed in an equitable manner against one another. One must
consider not only the absolute injury caused by the neighboring
state, but also the relation of the advantage gained by one to
the injury caused to the other. (Emphasis added.)' 0'
While the German court saw an analogy in relations between
members of the German Federation and relations between states in the
international arena, the same approach was pursued neither by India, nor,
to a certain extent, by the United States.
On April 1, 1948, one day after the tribunal set up to resolve ques-
tions arising out of Partition ceased to exist, East Punjab cut off irriga-
tion supplies to canals which crossed into Pakistan. 2 The flow of most
of the water was eventually restored by East Punjab. The Inter-Domin-
ion Agreement between the Government of India and the Government of
Pakistan on the Canal Water Dispute between East and West Punjab,
signed in May, 1948, incorporated the East Punjab assertions of terri-
torial supremacy. This contention was stated in Article 1, which pro-
vided that:
• . . proprietary rights in the waters of the rivers in East
Punjab vest wholly in the East Punjab Government and that the
West Punjab Government cannot claim any share of these
waters as a right. 3
The Government of West Punjab disputed this contention asseting that
it had "a right to the waters of the East Punjab rivers."'0 4 However,
since both governments were anxious to settle the dispute in a spirit of
goodwill and friendship, the East Punjab Government assured the West
Punjab Government that "without prejudice to its legal rights in the
sought restraining orders against each other and Prussia intervened as a Danubian
riparian.
101. Id. at 130-31.
102. See A. MlcHErL, supra note 28, at 196-97.
103. 54 U.N.T.S. 46.
104. Id.
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matter . . . it has no intention suddenly to withhold water from West
Punjab without giving it time to tap alternative sources."'05 The West
Punjab Government agreed, on its part, to deposit with the Reserve Bank
of India such ad hoc sum as might be specified by the Prime Minister of
India, out of which an undisputed sum would be transferred immediately
to the East Punjab Government." 6 On the whole, the Indian position
has been that it has "exclusive jurisdiction and control" of water in its
own parts of the river and that in the above mentioned agreement India
merely "agreed to delay the exercise of its legal rights" so as to enable
Pakistan to make alternative arrangements." 7
In 1945, the position of the United States was described:
The United States appears to be reluctant to admit that the
territorial sovereign is legally subject to restraint which it has
not itself undertaken by treaty to observe.0 8
This position was enunicated in 1895 by U.S. Attorney General Harmon
with regard to the Mexican complaint that acts committed within the
United States reduced the flow of the Rio Grande River at the Mexican
border to the damage and hardship of numerous Mexican inhabitants."0 9
The Attorney General, in concluding his opinion, said:
The case presented is a novel one. Whether the circumstances
made it possible or proper to take any action from considera-
tion of committee is a question which does not pertain to this
department; but that question should be decided as one of policy
only, because, in my opinion, the rules, principles, and pre-
cedents of international law impose no liability or obligation
upon the United States."0
This conclusion was based on the principle that every nation has
absolute sovereignty within its own territory and on the premise that the
doctrine of natural servitudes does not apply to cases in which it "would
interfere with the enjoyment, by a nation within its own territory, of
whatever was necessary to the development of its resources or the
comfort of its people."'
The record of the United States' practice, however, reveals some
105. Id. Art. 3.
106. Id. Art. 5.
107. Bains, supra note 19, at 44.
108. C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE
UNITED STATES 566 (1947).
109. J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 653, 654 (1906).
110. 21 Op. AT'Y GEN. 274, 283 (1895).
111. Id.
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reluctance to press for the privileges of its sovereignty." 2 Even the
Mexican complaint, which provoked the Harmon doctrine, was settled
by the agreement of 1906 which provided for the delivery to Mexico of
a specified volume of water annually."' Yet, this agreement incorporated
stipulations that negated any interpretation of the instrument as a re-
pudiation by the United States of the territorial supremacy principles."14
Subsequent treaties between the United States and Mexico or Canada
maintain to a certain extent this duality between practicalities and legal
theory."
A change in the United States' position is evident in a 1958 State
Department memorandum." 6 This memorandum concluded that:
1. A riparian has the sovereign right to make maximum use of
the part of a system of international waters within its juris-
diction consistent with the corresponding right of each riparian.
2. (a) Riparians are entitled to share in the use and benefits
of a system of international waters on a just and reasonable
basis."'
These principles were employed by the United States in support of its
objection to the Canadian Fraser diversion plan, contemplating a diversion
of the Columbia into the Fraser River."8 Canada disputed the contention
that equitable apportionment was an established principle of international
law and claimed that this principle was primarily a product of interstate
cases before the United States Supreme Court." 0 The dispute was settled
with the conclusion of a treaty relating to cooperative development of
water resources in the Columbia River basin. 2' In the treaty the parties
recognized that
112. C. HYDE, supra note 108, at 567, 571-77.
113. CONVENTION PROVIDING FOR THE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF THE WATERS OF
THE Rio GRANDE FOR IRRIGATION PURPOSES, May 21, 1906, Arts. 1, 2 cited in W.
MALLOY, U.S. TREATIES 1776-1909, 1202 (1910).
114. Id. Arts. 4, 5.
115. For the view that U.S. international rivers treaties with Mexico from 1906
and 1944 and with Canada from 1909 do not repudiate the Harmon Doctrine, see Bains
supra, note 19, at 42, 43. Members of the Committee of the American Branch of the
International Law Association took the position that the United States had in practice
never followed the Harmon Doctrine and by 1945, at least, had repudiated it, see
Laylin, supra note 96, at 29.
116. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE USE OF SYSTEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL WATERS: MEM JORANDUM OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT (1958).
117. Id. at 89, 90.
118. Johnson, supra note 58, at 716-22.
119. Id. at 722-23.
120. TREATY WITH CANADA RELATING TO COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
WATER RESOURCES OF THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN, supra note 60.
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the greatest benefit to each country can be secured by coopera-
tive measures for hydroelectric power generation and flood con-
trol, which will make possible other benefits as well.'21
But the application of this conviction was restricted to the specific
arrangement provided for in the treaty and for the period of the Treaty
only. Article XVII, titled "Restoration of Pre-Treaty Legal Status,"
provided that:
Nothing in this Treaty and no action taken or foregone pur-
suant to its provisions shall be deemed, after its termination
or expiration, to have abrogated or modified any of the rights
or obligations of the United States of America or Canada
under then existing international law, with respect to the uses
of the water resources of Columbia River basin." 2
In conclusion, the principles adopted on the federal level support the
modern international legal approach to benefit allocation of international
river basins. However, the acceptance of these principles as governing
law in controversies between members of a federal state does not neces-
sarily imply recognition by the federal states that the same principles are
applicable to controversies over international river basins.
ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE PROCESS OF EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT
Analysis of these three approaches indicates that equitable
apportionment is to be viewed as the consequence of a conciliation process
rather than as a point of departure capable of being cast into a concrete
formula. It is necessary, therefore, to analyze the issues which may be
raised in the conciliation process.
What considerations guide apportionment of benefits? This problem
involves selecting those factors which should bear on the apportionment,
demarcating their impact in relation to each other and transferring such
demarcation to terms of benefits. These elements may be illustrated by
simplifying some of the Indus Commission recommendations on the
dispute between Sind and Punjab,"' where the considerations bearing on
apportionment were the irrigational needs of both provinces, Sind's
prior apportionment and her wasteful irrigation practice. The effect of
Sind's inefficient irrigation method was to reduce the impact of her
prior apportionment, without impairing her irrigational uses, while better
satisfying Punjab's irrigational needs. Thus the construction of the
121. Id. Preamble.
122. Id. Art. XVII.
123. See text accompanying notes 95-97 supra.
RIPARIAN COMPETITION
Bhakra Dam in Punjab for increased withdrawals from the rivers was
allowed, and Sind was apportioned the water amounts calculated to satisfy
her irrigational uses under a more efficient irrigation method.
The issue often is more complicated as the dispute over the Jordan
system illustrates. Irrigational needs in that case invoked such considera-
tions as food production, absorption of unemployed labor force, rise in the
standard of living, saving of foreign exchange and political and security
interests. Prior appropriation did not constitute a major factor, since
most of the river flow was yet unexploited. The scarity of available water
resources necessarily invites consideration of relevant needs in light of
feasible alternatives and efficiency of uses. Thus the ultimate relevancy of
factors such as savings of foreign exchange, absorption of labor force and
political and security interests may be challenged; the feasibility of pursu-
ing alternative economic policies capable of satisfying these needs would
have to be explored and likewise the efficiency of existing uses would
have to be inspected. Some instances of misuse of water and land
resources have been encountered with respect to both Jordan and Israel.
The reasons for those misuses included inadequate experimentation and
research, the inhibitive social structure and the ascendancy of political
over economic interests. The removal of these causes would involve
financial expenditures, a long process of social change and the subjecting
of political interests to economic reason. Thus the impact of inefficiency
upon the apportionment of the benefits would have to be considered in the
light of financial, social and political factors; the determination of the
relevancy of the various considerations and the extent of their impact on
the apportiontment is likely to involve reconciliation of economic, social
and political policies.
Two other sets of issues relate to the essence of the development
project and the supervisional arrangements. Although these issues con-
cern executive or administrative aspects, they are likely to constitute the
starting point for discussing allocation of benefits and bear directly on
the resulting allocation.
In a regional integrated river basin development project, the issue
is how to provide for the needs of the riparians most efficiently. The
number of the regional projects advanced for the development of the
Jordan system is illustrative. In unilateral development projects the issue
would be whether a given project interferes with existing or contemplated
projects of the other riparians. The potential effect of the Canadian
Fraser Diversion Scheme on downstream United States facilities was one
of the two controversial issues in the Columbia River dispute.
The administration issue relates to the provision of supervisory
arrangements for the operation of a regional project or withdrawals by
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unilateral projects. The magnitude of the issue usually depends on the
degree of confidence the riparians have in each other. Thus the United
States and Canada were able to come to terms on this issue, while Israel
and the Arab countries smothered the Unified Plan by disagreeing on
this point. Similarly, the mistrust between India and Pakistan motivated
the rejection of a regional integrated development of the rivers shared by
them.
To sum up, the consequence of equitable apportionment may involve
the process of settling three sets of issues: selection of projects, apportion-
ment of benefits and supervisory arrangements.
CONCLUSION
Many experts agree that the unit area which affords the optimum
opportunities for planning the development of an international river is
the entire basin, embracing the main stream and all its tributaries.
Progressive regulation of international rivers should, therefore, be directed
at stimulating development on a unit basin approach. The territorial
supremacy and the territorial integrity doctrines, being oriented toward
safeguarding the interests of either upper or lower riparians, are re-
pugnant to the comprehensive approach. On the other hand, the doctrine
of equitable apportionment is in line with such an approach, since it is
oriented toward satisfying equally the interests of all riparians. The
doctrine of equitable apportionment alone, however, establishes only the
equal right of each riparian to an equitable share in the benefits of the
river. It does not specifically call for joint development, although it is
capable of encouraging such cooperation. The premise that the total
benefits of the river have to be shared equitably by all the riparians is
apt to engender the incentive for enlarging the opportunities to be shared
through joining in a regional project.
The role played by the equitable apportionment doctrine in the
conclusion of the treaty relating to cooperative development of the water
resources of the Columbia River basin is evidenced in a study made on
the controversy over this river.' According to this study, most lawyers
and statesmen on both sides of the border agreed that the Harmon
Doctrine" was incorporated into the Boundary Water Treaty of 1909
in force between the two countries. But the application of this doctrine to
the dispute was rejected since it would have made joint planning and
development an impossibility. On the other hand, the doctrine of equitable
apportionment emerged as the widely favored principle for the solution of
the dispute despite the disagreement over the question whether it was
124. Johnson, supra note 58.
125. Id. at 758.
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already an accepted principle of international law. The impact of the
doctrine on the actual negotiations is described as follows:
The equitable apportionment concept played an important part
in the resolution of the Columbia dispute. As applied here it was
not thought to set a rigid formula for settlement. Rather it set
a tone and created an atmosphere that made negotiations
easier and permitted compromise of even the most knotty pro-
blems. Once the disputants had accepted equitable apportion-
ment as their basic premise, they were encouraged, if not
required, to move away from extreme positions toward the
middle range of alternatives more acceptable to the other side.
Given this climate for negotiations, the specific plan of the
Treaty had to be thrashed out in the political arena. Each side
wanted something the other had; they simply had to negotiate
the price of the trade. 2 '
The doctrine of equitable apportionment, favorable as it is, has
limits set by the indefinite terms of its fundamental conceptions. Accept-
ance of the doctrine by disputing riparians cannot insure its being ex-
pressed in concrete terms of respective benefits. Israel and the Arab
states accepted the doctrine of equitable apportionment to be the prevailing
principle, but they differed on what amounted to equitable shares. That
differences are likely to arise not only in connection with political emnity
is evidenced by the record of disputes between the more cohesive entities,
such as the members of a federal state, which are connected by political,
economic, legal, cultural and traditional ties. Yet in the case of disputes
between members of federal states, the availability of an immediate
supreme authority (whether judicial or administrative) insures that the
accepted doctrine will be interpreted into a concrete apportionment of
benefits.
Thus, the usefulness of the doctrine of equitable apportionment is
limited because it lacks the quality of self-application 27 and depends
upon agreements or authoritative decisions for the concrete interpretation
of its terms.
126. Id. But cf. Krutilla, supra note 60. Krutilla observes that, in a restricted
sense, "the ultimate division of the gains appears to be inequitable." However, he
qualifies this statement, saying that "unless one knows all the elements of the broader
background, therefore, one cannot properly judge the equity of the Columbia Treaty
terms." Id. at 96.
127. The quality of self-application is used here in the sense of a definite rule
which can be applied without further definition of its terms. For example, a rule which
determines the extent of territorial waters would be self-applicable in this sense. Con-
versely, the rule of equitable apportionment cannot be applied without defining what
equitable shares amount to.
